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A Private User Data Protection Mechanism in TrustZone Architecture
Based on Identity Authentication
Bo Zhao, Yu Xiao , Yuqing Huang, and Xiaoyu Cui
Abstract: In TrustZone architecture, the Trusted Application (TA) in the secure world does not certify the identity
of Client Applications (CA) in the normal world that request data access, which represents a user data leakage
risk. This paper proposes a private user data protection mechanism in TrustZone to avoid such risks. We add
corresponding modules to both the secure world and the normal world and authenticate the identity of CA to prevent
illegal access to private user data. Then we analyze the system security, and perform validity and performance tests.
The results show that this method can perform effective identity recognition and control of CA to protect the security
of private user data. After adding authentication modules, the data operation time of system increases by about
0.16 s, an acceptable price to pay for the improved security.
Key words: embedded system; TrustZone; Trusted Application (TA); identity authentication; private data protection

1

Introduction

As the information processing capacity of mobile
terminals rises, more and more data handling tasks are
transferred to mobile devices. But the complexity and
openness of terminal systems make them targets of
malware, such as virus and Trojans, and users’ private
data is vulnerable to theft and tampering. To address
this challenge, ARM proposes a software and hardware
architecture, TrustZone, based on secure isolation. It
divides the software and hardware resources of the
system into two parts, each belongs to one “world”:
a secure world and a normal world[1] . The system
controls resource access authority via bus, so that
normal-world processes can only access normal-world
resources while secure-world processes can access all
resources[2] . The secure world is a trusted execution
environment. When processing operations include
users’ private information and involve security services,
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this arrangement prevents normal-world access to avoid
private-data attacks at run time[3] .
However, data protection includes not only dynamic
security at run time, but also static security in
storage. After processing, the data is stored in a
normal-world memory area. The data is far from
secure if malicious activities such as data theft and
damage in static storage cannot be resisted. Staticdata security includes storage-media security, storageenvironment security, virus defense, and storage-access
security[4] . The first two are hardware issues, while
malicious activities using viruses include data theft
and data tampering. Aiming at this problem, many
researchers have proposed feasible defense schemes
base on embedded TrustZone architecture. Wei[5]
realized a trusted operating system, T-OS, in TrustZone.
They added an encryption module based on various
encryption algorithms, and stored the encrypted data
in a file system realized in a security chip. Zhao et
al.[6] produced a root of trust based on SRAM Physical
Unclonable Functions (PUFs) without adding security
hardware. They generated a security key to encrypt data
using this root of trust, and stored the encrypted data in
the system hardware. Hein et al.[7] realized a security
block device that depends on there being a trusted root
key in the system. Combined with Merkle-Tree and
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authenticated encryption, this method can prevent data
tampering, redirection attacks, and reply attacks.
Existing research focuses on the data encryption and
storage in TrustZone, but does not consider the dataaccess security problem. According to the TEE Internal
Core API Specification[8] , the manipulation of data is
controlled by the Trusted Application (TA) in the secure
world. Each TA owns a storage area in memory to
store the data it creates. This area can only be accessed
by its TA, thus avoiding data leakage among different
TAs. Nonetheless, a TA does not verify the identity of
data-access requesters; a malicious attacker could forge
its identity and get users’ private data stored by other
applications via normal data-access processes.
To solve this problem, this paper proposes a
private user data protection mechanism in TrustZone
architecture based on identity authentication. We add an
identity verification module to a multi-user TrustZone
environment, and establish the correspondence between
a data object and its owner to verify the identity of each
data access requester. This mechanism guarantees the
security of data access, and enhances the protection of
users’ private data.

2

Threat Model

In TrustZone, different Client Applications (CA) in the
normal world make data processing requests, and the
commands are sent to the underlying driver via a client
API. Then they are sent to a TA in the secure world
through an SMC instruction call. The TA sends the
command to the Internal API, and then calls kernel
functions to perform data processing operations.
There is no secure permanent storage area in
TrustZone. The system allocates an independent storage
area, TA Space, in storage devices of the normal world,
such as flash memory, for each TA to store data objects
it creates. When creating a data object, a TA allocates an
ID for it, and generates a directory in its own TA Space,
named for the Object ID. Then it encrypts the object
and stores the encrypted data in the new directory in a
block. When a CA requests access to a data object, the
kernel reads the encrypted data from the normal world
into the secure world via its Object ID, and returns the
decrypted data to the CA. The overall framework is
shown in Fig. 1.
This mechanism guarantees storage security and
runtime data security. But the TA does not check the
identity of the CA requesting data access, and only

Fig. 1

TrustZone framework.

checks whether the Object ID provided by the CA is
legal. There is no security protection scheme for the
flash memory that stores objects, and its contents can
be accessed by anyone. Thus, an attacker could read the
directory name, namely, the Object ID, which stores the
object and the request for access to the object to get the
private user data illegally. The threat model is shown in
Fig. 2.
CA1 requests for creating new data Object1 , then TA1
allocates Object1 ID and sends the request to the kernel.
The kernel creates a directory named after Object1 ID
in TA1 Space of flash and stores the encrypted object
in block under the directory. Meanwhile, the attacker
CA2 looks up for the new directory in flash to get the
Object1 ID and sends request for accessing Object1 to
TA1 . TA1 checks that the Object1 ID is in TA1 Space
and then loads the encrypted data of Object1 into secure
world, decrypts it and then returns the Object1 to CA2 .
TA1 does not check whether Object1 is created by CA2
or not and thus resulting in the object leakage and the
private data of CA1 is under heavy security threat.
Following the threat model, we performed the attack
experiment on a Hikey board. We created two CAs

Fig. 2

Threat model of data access in TrustZone.
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(CA1 and CA2 ). CA1 created Object1 whose ObjectID
was 0000 and content was “this is object access test”.
Then CA1 and CA2 both requested access to Object1
via ObjectID 0000. The results are shown in Figs. 3
and 4.
The results show that both CAs were able to obtain
the content of Object1 —indicating that the TA does not
recognize whether the requesting CA is the creator of
the requested Object, and therefore returns the content
to all requesters. Therefore, the users’ private data is at
risk.

3

3.1

User-Data Protection Mechanism Based
on Identity Authentication
Identity authentication framework

To protect users’ private data, we should authenticate
the identity of any CA requesting data access. The
authentication process involves interaction among
a CA, an Identity Obtaining Daemon, a TA, an
Identity Authentication Module, and the access and
modification of a Data Authentication Table. The
framework is shown in Fig. 5. The modules added to
the original TrustZone include the following:
(1) Identity-Obtaining Daemon (IOD): A process to
obtain the identity of a CA; it runs in the normal world.
We use technologies such as software protection to
ensure its security.

Fig. 3

CA1 requests access to Object1 .

Fig. 4

CA2 requests access to Object1 .

Fig. 5

Identity authentication framework.

(2) Identity Authentication Module (IAM): The core
of the CA identity authentication process; it runs in
the secure world, and performs access, search, and
modify operations on the Data Authentication Table.
Its security is guaranteed by the isolated execution
environment provided by TrustZone.
(3) Data Authentication Table (DAT): A table that
stores the correspondence of the CA, the TA and the
data object. It is the key to CA identity authentication.
3.2

CA identity authentication design

CA identity authentication has two steps: CA identity
obtainment in the normal world and CA identity
authentication in the secure world. Here is a detailed
description of these two steps.
3.2.1

Identity obtainment

We must obtain the CA identity before authentication.
The normal world is not secure, and there may be
attackers pretending to be normal CAs. Thus, the
identity is not provided by the CA, but by the newly
added IOD.
The framework of the CA identity obtainment
module is shown in Module 1 of Fig. 5. When the
request command of a CA is transmitted to Client API,
Client API determines the command type. If it is related
to a data operation, the IOD begins to obtain the CA
identity and send it to the secure world. The identity
is authenticated in the secure world; the authentication
method is explained in Section 3.2.3.
The most important part of the process is getting
the identity of CA. CA is a normal process running in
the operating system, and has a corresponding image
in memory. The image exists in memory before the
program ends, and contains information related to the
process. Parts of the image, such as the data segment,
change dynamically while the program runs; other
parts, such as code segments, remain the same during
the whole running period. The invariant parts could be
used to identify the uniqueness of the process.
In the Linux kernel, the system creates a PID hash
table via pidhash init() during the initiating procedure,
and allocates a unique id for each process[9] . With the
help of the PID hash table, we could find the process
descriptor of a process via its id (processID ). The
process descriptor data structure task struct includes
a memory descriptor field named mm struct that
describes the data storage of a process. The detailed
structure is shown in Fig. 6.
The address space of a process can be accessed
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Data storage structure of a process in memory.

by mm struct[10] . In that space, [start code, end code)
indicates the address of the code segment, and we can
obtain its value. The CA identity is based on this value.
Here is how this process works:
Step 1 IOD receives the processID sent by Client
API, and finds its process descriptor task struct in the
process list.
Step 2 IOD jumps to the mm struct via task struct
of the process, and obtains the basic addresses of the
process, such as for a code segment, a data segment, or
a parameter segment. The addresses are linear.
Step 3 IOD transforms the linear address into a
physical address and gets the content. We choose the
code segment, which remains unchanged during the
running period, to compute the CA identity.
Step 4 IOD computes the hash value of the code
and signs the value and timestamp with a private key.
Then it connects the signature and hash value as the CA
identity CAIDE , and sends it to Client API.
3.2.2

Identity authentication

In the secure world, we need to modify some
components to authenticate the CA identity. TA
receives the SMC command from the normal world,
while Internal API calls the kernel to activate
real functions. Therefore, we added an Identity
Authentication Module (IAD) between the two
components to effect identity authentication. The
framework of the CA identity authentication module is
shown in Module 2 of Fig. 5.
IAM runs in the secure world; its security is
guaranteed by the trusted execution environment
isolated by TrustZone. This module performs two
functions: one is to receive requests from the normal
world delivered by TA, and check the validity of the
timestamp and hash value with CAIDE ; the other is to
check whether the requested object is owned by the
requesting CA by looking it up in the DAT.
A key component in the process is the DAT. Below,
we describe its design, maintenance, and security
guarantee.

(1) Design of the DAT
The DAT must maintain the correspondence of the
CA and the object to perform the CA authentication.
Therefore, the CA hash value and the object ID must
be stored in the table. TrustZone provides independent
storage space for each TA to store the objects created
by it. Thus, the DAT must store the TA ID to make
it possible to locate the TA when searching the table.
After locating the TA and the object, the process must
check whether the CA hash value in the table is the same
as the requesting CA hash value to decide whether to
allow access to the requested object. At the same time, a
flag is set in the table whose function is described below.
The design of the DAT is shown in Table 1.
(2) Maintenance of the DAT
The DAT is stored in the normal world, and
loaded into the secure world when system boots. Its
contents are updated in real time once there is data
operation in the secure world. Alterations should be
synchronized with normal-world storage. According
to the object operation functions in the TEE Internal
Core API Specification, the following processes involve
modification of the DAT:
(a) Object creation. When creating a new object, we
create a new entry in the DAT and store the related TAID ,
ObjectID , and CAhash , and set the flag to 1. The request
is sent to the Internal API. If the creation succeeds, the
flag is set to 0 to indicate the validity of the entry; else,
the entry is deleted.
(b) Object renaming. When there is an object
renaming request, IAM checks if the ObjectID matches
the requesting CAhash . If it matches, the request is
passed to the Internal API. If the request completes
successfully, IAM modifies the ObjectID in the table to
the new ID.
(c) Object deletion. When there is an object deletion
request, the IAM authenticates the identity of the
requesting CA. If the requested object belongs to the
Table 1
Trusted
application ID

TAID1

TAID2


Design of Data Authentication Table.
Requested
object ID
ObjectID1
ObjectID2
ObjectID3

ObjectID4



Client
application ID
CAhash1
CAhash1
CAhash2

CAhash3



Flag
Flag1
Flag2
Flag3

Flag4
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CA, the request is sent to the Internal API. If the object
is successfully deleted, the related entry in the IAM is
deleted.
3.2.3

Identity authentication process

After adding identity authentication modules to
TrustZone, we can determine the identity of a CA
requesting data access, and ensure that only the CA that
created the object can access it. The process, from a CA
requesting data access, to the secure world returning a
result, is shown in Fig. 7.
Step 1 CA ! Client API: REQ(ObjectID ). CA sends
data operation REQ that includes requested ObjectID to
TEE Client API. Client API determines the operation
type and if it is data related, execute Client API
! IOD: processID , or execute Client API ! TA:
REQ(ObjectID ).
Step 2 IOD finds the code segment content of CA
according to processID , and gets its hash value CAhash .
CAIDE =CAhash +Sign(CAhash +timestamp). Then IOD
signs the CAhash and timestamp with a private key, and
connects the signature and CAhash as CAIDE , and returns
it to TEE Client API.
Step 3 Client API ! TA: REQ(ObjectID , CAIDE ).
Client API packages the CAIDE and data operation
request REQ and sends them to TA in the secure world
via SMC.
Step 4 TA ! IAM: REQ(ObjectID , CAIDE , TAID ).
TA receives the data from the normal world and sends
it to IAM together with its own identity TAID . IAM
separates the CAhash and the signature, and verifies
the signature to get timestamp and CA0hash . Then IAM
checks the validity of timestamp, and then checks
if CA0hash is equal to CAhash . If all the checks are
successful, it indicates that the data came from the

Fig. 7

rightful IOD and is credible.
Step 5 Check if(ObjectID 2 CAhash ). IAM searches
the DAT and gets the CAhash of the requested Object.
Then IAM checks if CAhash is the same as the requester
CAhash . If it is not, this shows that the object was
not created by the CA, and the access request is then
denied.
Step 6 IAM sends ObjectID and TAID to the Internal
API. The API calls the kernel to the requested data
operation. Then IAM modifies the DAT according to
the returned result, and sends the result to TA. Finally,
the result is delivered to the CA.
3.3

Security analysis

To analyze the security of our approach, we focus
on the newly added modules: IOD, IAM, and DAT.
Since TrustZone architecture provides an isolated
environment and guarantees the credibility of the secure
world, we consider the IAM, which runs in secure
world, secure, and offer a detailed security analysis of
the other two modules.
3.3.1

IOD

The IOD produces asymmetrical keys, and uses the
private key to sign data while delivering the public key
to the secure world for verification. It is the subject of
the identity obtainment process, and owns a private key,
so it is of great importance to guarantee its security. In
the current study, technologies such as shell adding[11] ,
process isolation[12] , and software protection[13] could
prevent monitoring and tampering by attackers. There
have already been some effective implementation
schemes. However, most of them involve complex
memory protection or process isolation, and are not the
key points of this paper. Thus, we consider the IOD to

Process of CA identity authentication.
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be secure, and do not give a detailed description of its
protection method.
3.3.2

DAT

TrustZone does not provide secure storage. To ensure
security, private data is usually encrypted before
storage. This paper adopts the widely used embedded
Multi-Media Controller (eMMC) in embedded devices
to guarantee the security of the DAT. eMMC refers
to a package consisting of both flash memory and
a flash-memory controller, integrated on the same
silicon die[14] . It offers a Replay-Protected Memory
Block (RPMB) partition that requires an authentication
key for access[15] . We refer to Ref. [6], and produce
a root of trust based on SRAM PUFs; we use it
as the authentication key. We also refer to some
new encryption schemes to increase the security and
efficiency of the encryption process[16–19] . The DAT is
stored in an RPMB partition. Since an attacker cannot
get the authentication key, its static storage security
is guaranteed. When the system boots, the DAT is
loaded into the secure world, where its dynamic running
security is guaranteed.

4

Experiment and Analysis

We built the private user data protection mechanism
based on identity authentication in a Hikey board. First,
we created the experimental environment. Then we
performed a validity test. Finally, we analyzed the
system performance after adding our new modules.
4.1

4.3

Performance analysis

After validating the functionality of our approach, we

Experimental environment

In the experiment, we cross-compiled an executable
program for a Hikey board in the Ubuntu 14.04.3
system.
The Hikey board is based on a HiSilicon Kirin
620 64-bit eight-core 1.2 GHz ARM Cortex-A53 CPU,
with 2 GB LPDDR3 SDRAM and 8 GB eMMC Flash
storage. The secure world ran in a trusted OS, the
open source OP-TEE[20] , and the normal world ran in
a Debian system.
4.2

Object1 (CAhash1 ). The two hash values are different, so
IAM denies the data request of CA2 .
We did the contrasting experiment on a Hikey board
to verify the effect of the proposed mechanism. Similar
to the experiment in the threat model, we created two
CAs (CA1 and CA2 ). CA1 created Object1 whose
ObjectID was 0000. Then CA1 and CA2 both requested
access to Object1 . The results are shown in Figs. 8 and
9.
In Fig. 8, the upper and lower parts show the output
of the normal world and the secure world of TrustZone,
respectively. CA1 , the creator of Object1 , requested
access to it via its ObjectID 0000. The secure world
verified the signature and timestamp, and searched the
DAT. It checked that the CAhash of Object1 is CA1 , and
approved the request. Finally, the secure world returned
the content of Object1 to CA1 . In Fig. 9, CA2 made
the same request, but hashCA2 did not match the hash
value in the DAT, so the secure world denied the object
request.
The result shows that only the creator CA of the
Object could access it; this indicates the mechanism can
determine the identity of a requester, and thus control
access to an object. This ensures that only the owner
of data can access it, and thereby protects users’ private
data.

Fig. 8

CA1 requests access to Object1 .

Fig. 9

CA2 requests access to Object1 .

Validity analysis

According to the threat model proposed in Section 2,
the validity test verifies whether a CA could access an
object that was not created by it. Attacker CA2 gets the
Object1 ID, and sends a request to access Object1 . IOD
gets the hash value of the requesting CA (CAhash2 ), and
sends it to the secure world. IAM in the secure world
searches the DAT, and gets the creator CA hash value of
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tested the performance of the data accessing operations
after adding modules to TrustZone. Object creation
involves the entire process: read the code segment
content; compute a hash value and sign in the normal
world; verify the signature; create an object, and modify
the DAT in the secure world. We performed the object
creation contrast test in the unmodified system and in
the modified system. To eliminate the effects of other
factors, we did not perform other data operations during
the experiment. We added a time recording function at
the start and end of the process, and printed out the time
lag. The experiment was repeated 10 times; the results
are shown in Fig. 10.
0.8
Native system

Modified system

Time of object creation (s)

0.7
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